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Unpublished Opening Lecture for the Course on the Theory of Relativity in Argentina, 
1925∗
Albert Einstein 
Translated by Alejandro Gangui and Eduardo L. Ortiz 
 
Honorable Rector, Honorable Professors, and Students of this University: In these times of 
political and economic struggle and nationalistic fragmentation, it is a particular joy for me to 
see people assembling here to give their attention exclusively1 to the highest values that are 
common to us all. I am glad to be in this blessed land before a small circle of people who are 
interested in topics of science to speak on those issues that, in essence, are the subject of my 
own meditations. 
In science, there are always two opposite and complementary goals that, owing to 
their mutual complementarity, constitute the essence of its progress. On the one hand, there is 
the quest for enlargement2 and enrichment of our understanding of some particular area of 
knowledge; and on the other hand, there is the endeavor to achieve a systematic unity of 
knowledge. In my work I have always attempted the latter; therefore, I wish to communicate 
here more accurate observations on this goal, the systematic unity of knowledge. 
Using as few hypothetical laws as possible, science attempts to explain relations 
between observable facts, arriving at them in a deductive manner, that is, in a purely logical 
way. Physics is customarily referred to as an empirical science and it is believed that its 
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1 Einstein added the word “exclusively” to his original draft. 
2 The text to this point is translated from the first page of the German manuscript of the lecture in 
Einstein’s handwriting. It was reproduced photographically and appeared in La Vida Literaria, Buenos 
Aires, 1931 (see fig. 2 in the Appendix) as well as in J. A. Stargardt’s catalogs 615 (1978), 117, and 
683 (2006), 189 (see fig. 3 in the Appendix). The text from this point (“und Bereicherung unseres 
Einzel-Wissens ...” ) to footnote 3 (“... durch eine zwangläufige Methode zu ersetzen ...”), is translated 
from the German excerpt printed in J. A. Stargardt’s catalog 683 (2006), 188 (see fig. 4 in the 
Appendix). 
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fundamental laws are deduced from experiments, so as to indicate how it differs from 
speculative philosophy. However, in truth the relationship between fundamental laws and 
facts from experience is not that simple. Indeed, there is no scientific method to deduce 
inductively these fundamental laws from experimental data. The formulation of a 
fundamental law is, rather, an act of intuition which can be achieved only by one who 
watches empirically with the necessary attention and has sufficient empirical understanding of 
the field in question. The sole criteria for the truth of a fundamental law is only that we can be 
sure that the relations between observable events can be logically deduced from it. It follows 
then that a fundamental law can be refuted in a definite manner, but can never be definitely 
shown to be correct, as one must always bear in mind the possibility of discovering a new 
phenomenon that contradicts the logical conclusions arising from a fundamental law. 
Experience is, therefore, the judge, but not the generator of fundamental laws. The 
transition from the facts of experience to a fundamental law often requires an act of free 
creativity from our imagination, as well as an act of creation of concepts and relations; it 
would not be possible to replace this act with a necessary and conclusive method.3
The fact that a concept in the presence of experience, even if originated from 
experience, has a certain logical independence is appreciated by considering extra-scientific 
thought. The observation of the existence of similar objects has given rise to the notion of 
number, but has not created it. In fact, people in some cultures have not gone any further than 
an understanding of only the smallest of numbers. 
Returning to the ideas and fundamental laws of physics, it is easy to show that 
starting from the facts of experience there is no fixed road taking us back to those ideas and 
fundamental laws. Let us consider, for example, the laws of motion on which classical 
astronomy rests. Using logical and mathematical methods we can deduce from Kepler’s laws 
Newton’s law on the [inverse]4 proportionality of force5 on the square of the distances. But 
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Galileo’s theorem, stating that force is proportional to acceleration, does not come 
immediately from experience; logically considered, it is a free statement. It comes from the 
intuitively acquired knowledge that the phenomena of motion can be easily understood if 
acceleration is regarded as the fundamental phenomenon whose causes are sought. That this is 
not obvious in itself – to be precise, that it is not necessary – can be seen by looking at the 
history of mechanics before Galileo. The logical arbitrariness of this point of view is revealed 
by the fact that the general theory of relativity6 has found it necessary to modify it. 
Not only are fundamental laws the result of an act of imagination that can not be 
controlled, but so are their ingredients, the ideas derived from those laws. Thus, the concept 
of acceleration was in itself an act of free creation of the mind which, even if supported by the 
observation of the motion of solid bodies, assumes as a precondition nothing less than the 
infinitesimal calculus. 
It follows from here that fundamental laws can be refuted not only by showing that 
the consequences attributed to them are wrong, inexact, or not generally applicable, but also 
can be refuted by showing that the concepts introduced for them do not suit the observed 
facts. 
In this respect the history of modern theoretical physics offers beautiful examples. In 
the kinetic theory of heat, temperature is an elementary concept that stands out in a discussion 
on fundamental relations in that science. The development of thermodynamics showed that, in 
a body isolated from exchanges with its surroundings for any length of time, energy fluctuates 
permanently around a fixed average value; the smaller the portion of the body considered, the 
larger the fluctuations. If we observe parts that are sufficiently smaller, a precise distinction 
between its thermal and mechanical energy loses its meaning. The apparent incongruence of 
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all these ideas is dispelled if we consider microscopically observable motions, such as those 
of very small particles suspended in liquids, as in the case of Brownian motion.7
The process of progress in theoretical science finds its expression not only in the fact 
that the relations expressed by elementary laws are replaced by others that are more precise, 
but also in the circumstance that elementary concepts that are associated with the most 
immediate perceptions of reality need to be replaced by newer ones, better suited to the 
complex data provided by experience. 
Will this development ever end? 
We, contemporary physicists, no longer believe so. For us, any theory is true only in 
the sense in which a parable can be true. 
 However, if neither in this sense can we penetrate the ultimate truths, we are 
nonetheless left with the joyful awareness that each and every generation of researchers 
advances more profoundly toward the knowledge of what is true and real compared to that of 
its predecessors. In this sense, we wish to take joy from the work of our forerunners, and put 
forth our best effort on our part, while we place confidence in the strength of those who will 
come after us. 
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Appendix
Fig. 1. Front page of the April issue of La Vida Literaria, Buenos Aires 1931. The Spanish
translation of Einstein’s lecture is visible below the photograph of Einstein flanked on the left
and right side by the German text of the discurso ine´dito in the author’s handwriting.
Appendix 455
Fig. 2. Detail of fig. 1, showing a reproduction of the first page of the original manuscript for
the 1925 lecture.
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Fig. 3. The first page of Einstein’s handwritten manuscript, reproduced in J. A. Stargardt’s
catalogs 615 (1978), 117, and 683 (2006), 188.
Appendix 457
Fig. 4. Fragment from Einstein’s lecture printed in J. A. Stargardt’s catalog 683 (2006), 188.
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Fig. 5. Fragment from Einstein’s lecture printed in J. A. Stargardt’s catalog 615 (1978), 117.
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Fig. 6. Detail of fig. 1, showing a reproduction of page 5 of Einstein’s handwritten manuscript.
